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PROVING FACTS IN AN ANTITRUST STORY
ALEXANDER KOGAN*

To invoke the power of the judiciary, an injured person must state a
claim on which relief may be granted. Such a person must describe his
injury to the court, must name the defendant and must allege facts establishing the defendant's legal responsibility for the injury. Typically,
the claimant's story of woe consists of two parts, which I will call descriptive and probative. The descriptive portion includes events that caused
the injury and the defendant's conduct leading to those events. For example, a victim of a car accident might tell how the defendant driver
negligently drove on the wrong side of the street and hit the victim's
oncoming car.
The claimant's story is incomplete with solely a description of the
events that are alleged to have led to the injury, however, if the defendant disputes this description's accuracy. The claimant must then convince the trier of fact of the veracity of this factual scenario. In order to
do that, he will include certain probative allegations that by themselves
do not give rise to liability, but rather lend support to the descriptive
theory on which the plaintiff has predicated his claim. For example,
people generally do not drive on the wrong side of the street, because
that violates the law and endangers their own lives. To convince the
trier of fact that the defendant did, in this particular instance, drive on
the wrong side of the street (a description that would give rise to liability), the plaintiff must include some probative allegations that persuade
the court that his story is true. Proof, then, is the second part of a claimant's story.
This Article discusses the nature of probative evidence that courts
should demand from antitrust claimants and argues that an antitrust
claim should contain an analytical theory that rationally explains the
conduct of all market participants.'
The Article first contrasts analytical-type proof with eyewitness-testimony proof, which I argue is less useful in antitrust claims. The Article
then illustrates the need for the kind of analytical proof that explains why
defendants and other actors whose conduct precipitated the claim would
behave in the manner alleged by the plaintiff. A recent Tenth Circuit
* Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1989. I am grateful to Richard Salgado, Richard Harris, Paul Scott, and
Edward Gaedel for their comments. The views expressed in this Article are solely my own
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Justice.

1. I do not talk about the elements of particular antitrust offenses, a matter of some
controversy that has been extensively addressed by courts and scholars alike. I do assume,
however, that one element of many antitrust claims, on the proof of which a claim's success often hinges, is harm to consumer welfare.
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decision, Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas,2 supplies the factual framework for the illustration. In Reazin, analysis of factors that motivated market participants to engage in certain allegedly illegal conduct
throws substantial doubt on whether that conduct was, in fact, illegal.
TYPES OF PROOF

To be persuasive, a story underlying a claim must contain elements
that make it believable. The story's authenticity depends on the credibility of the storytellers, the party's witnesses, and on its intrinsic plausibility. One type of proof designed to convince the trier of fact of the
descriptive fact's plausibility requires a rational explanation of the defendant's conduct. The plaintiff in the car crash example above may include in his story testimony or physical evidence to the effect that the
defendant's diminished mental capacity at the time of the accident
caused him to choose to drive on the wrong side of the street.
Alternatively, rather than explaining the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff may simply bring a sufficient number of eyewitnesses to testify
that they personally observed the defendant driving on the wrong side
of the road and smashing into the plaintiff's car. With this kind of
proof, lack of a sensible explanation for the defendant's conduct does
not by itself preclude a finding of liability. The claimant is only required
to convince the trier of fact that the defendant negligently3 engaged in
conduct actually and proximately causing a legally cognizable injury to
the plaintiff; an inquiry into the etiology of the defendant's conduct may
help persuade the trier of fact of the veracity of the allegations, but is
not essential. The victim in this hypothetical may use the defendant's
inebriation to prove the facts in his story, but he may also rely exclusively on the accounts of people who witnessed the accident.
Thus, a story in a typical non-antitrust case often does not require
any plausible explanation of the person's conduct as a prerequisite for
the finding of liability. An allegation of injurious conduct, even if ostensibly implausible, if proved to the required standard of certainty and not
otherwise excusable, is sufficient for a finding of liability.
An antitrust complaint is different. An antitrust offense is committed usually by a business person or entity in pursuit of some form of
commercial advantage. 4 Courts have made clear through their interpretations of antitrust statutes over the years that, at least in cases where the
2. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
3. I am not discussing negligence in this example. It is possible for the defendant to
come back with his own story that, while admitting the factual scenario alleged by the
claimant, offers a rational explanation for the defendant's conduct, and argues that the
conduct was justified and not negligent. The point, however, is that the plaintiff's failure
to explain why the defendant would behave in a way that does not make much sense, does
not negate the presumption of liability, once it is otherwise established.
4. Most of the federal antitrust law is codified in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988), and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988). Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, and Section
4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, provide formal definitions of
"Antitrust Laws" and "Antitrust Acts" respectively.
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rule of reason applies, they can remedy an injury under the antitrust
laws only when the defendant's conduct has, on balance, harmed consumers. 5 Where the complainant is the defendant's competitor, 6 merely
showing that the defendant caused damage to the plaintiff is generally
insufficient when antitrust laws are the authority for the requested remedy. In addition to linking his own injury with the defendant's actions,
the plaintiff must also demonstrate that people other than himself have
been harmed by the defendant's conduct.
The requirement of consumer harm in a particular product and geographic market creates a peculiar problem of proof in antitrust cases,
since eyewitness-type accounts by themselves are never sufficient to
prove allegations of harm to consumer interests.
First, injury to a large class of consumers may be imperceptible
even to the consumers themselves. For example, an anticompetitive
merger of two soft-drink concentrate manufacturers 7 could cause a reduction in the production of soft drinks accompanied by an increase in
their price. Many consumers, however, might remain blissfully unaware
of the harm they suffer, since a few cents' increase in the price of a six8
pack of soda would not significantly dent anyone's budget.
Second, no matter how many individual consumers testify about the
perceived harm to them personally, this is inadequate to prove a violation of the antitrust laws. Such testimony is insufficient to establish liability unless it supports a broader theory that demonstrates the
likelihood of harm to all consumers of the particular product, most of
whom are unavailable to the court.
Finally, consumer testimony regarding higher prices does not establish a causal link between the price increase and the defendant's conduct. Legitimate market forces, rather than the defendant, could be
responsible for the increase. Analogously, prices may remain unchanged even when the defendant acts to suppress competition; this
would happen when market forces exert a downward pressure on price,
5. Under that approach, a "restraint of trade" must be unreasonable to be illegal.
The Supreme Court's often repeated admonition that "[a]ntitrust laws are designed for
the protection of competition, not competitors," Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,

320 (1962) (emphasis in original), elegantly encapsulates what has by now become almost
a truism to an antitrust lawyer.
This Article does not address per se restraints of trade, such as collective price setting

by competitors, and this discussion does not apply to such cases.
6. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, authorizes any person to sue for
three times the damages sustained as a result of the defendant's violation of antitrust laws.
7. See FTC v. Coca-Cola, 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986) (preliminary injunction
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act against acquisition of Dr. Pepper Company by CocaCola). For an extensive discussion of the FTC's successful challenges to abortive attempts
at consolidation in the soft-drink industry (Coke/Dr. Pepper and Pepsi/Seven-Up), see
White, Application of Merger Guidelines: The Proposed Merger of Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, THE
ANTITRUST REvoLtrIoN (. Kwoka & L. White eds. 1989).

8. The aggregate harm obviously is significant. This is a classic example of a collective action problem which shows the need for government enforcement of antitrust laws.
The Clayton Act authorizes the Attorney General to sue on behalf of the United States to
enjoin anticompetitive mergers. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). The Federal Trade Commission
also possesses that authority. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988).
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but the defendant's anticompetitive conduct prevents the market from
working and keeps the price higher than it should be.
The need to demonstrate consumer harm thus requires that the
probative aspects of any story of antitrust injury, whether told by a public or a private plaintiff, contain a logical, inductive interpretation of the
injurious conduct. Analysis of the market participants' motives explains
their actions and clarifies the effects of those actions on consumer welfare. "[I]f the factual context renders [an antitrust] . . .claim implausible - if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense . .. -9

then the plaintiff's burden in proving consumer harm is almost hopelessly heavy.
WESLEY'S STORY

When Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), a health care financing company, acquired Wesley Medical Center, a large hospital in
Wichita, Kansas, Wesley suddenly found itself in the middle of a dispute
between the area's two large health insurers.' 0 HCA (Wesley's new
owner) sold a variety of medical insurance products, including HMO
memberships, which placed it in direct competition with Wichita's largest health insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, the recipient of
some sixty-two percent of the total insurance premiums in the area."
Blue Cross, understandably unhappy about the entry of a new competitor, publicly announced its intention to terminate its contracting provider agreement with Wesley. Under the contracting provider
agreements Blue Cross had with all major hospitals in the area, participating hospitals agreed to accept from Blue Cross payment rates set out
in the Blue Cross schedule for the Wichita area as payment in full. In
return, hospital patients benefitted from direct submission and payment
of hospital claims, as well as from the predictability of costs and the assurance of the hold-harmless provisions. In short, Wesley's status as a
Blue Cross contracting provider was valuable to hospitals interested in
doing business in Wichita, and lack of such status would leave Wesley at
a significant competitive disadvantage by increasing its costs of doing
business.
Simultaneous with Blue Cross' termination of Wesley, the insurer
obtained an agreement from two of Wesley's chief competitors to lower
the rate schedule which those competitors had to follow for all Blue
Cross patients, as contracting providers. The court found "ample evidence" that Wesley's competitors' acquiescence to lower rates had been
9. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
10. See Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied 110 S.Ct. 3241 (1990). Discussion that follows draws on this opinion and on two
published trial court decisions, Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 635
F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986) (pre-trial motions), and Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Kansas, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987) (post-trial motions). All three
opinions address a large number of significant issues and contain many factual details that
are not essential to the argument in this Article.
11. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 969 n.26.
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conditioned on Wesley's termination. 1 2 These competitors, according
to the court's findings, expected that they would gain some of Wesley's
patients as Wesley's costs of doing business increased (i.e., Wesley had
to make an extra effort in order to retain patients who were inconvenienced by Wesley's loss of preferred provider status). For the promise
of such additional patients, they had been willing to accept lower prices
3
for their services from Blue Cross. '
The principal element in Wesley's story was the alleged agreement
between Blue Cross and the two hospitals competing with Wesley. First,
Wesley asserted that it was a victim of that agreement. As a result of the
agreement, Wesley sustained financial losses, and the causal linkage that
existed between those losses and Blue Cross' actions was legally sufficient in its directness and proximity.1 4 Second, attempting to meet the
rule of reason requirements, Wesley insisted that it was not the only
victim of Blue Cross' conduct, but also that Blue Cross' actions had hurt
consumers as well. Blue Cross' liability for Wesley's injuries hinged on
this allegation. As in most antitrust cases, it is this accusation that was
most disputed and most controversial.
WESLEY'S PROOF

Wesley's story thus consisted of two parts. The first part had to do
with harm to Wesley, while the second part was about harm to
consumers.
The descriptive aspect of the first half of the story, which involves
the showing of harm to Wesley, is fairly straightforward. It focuses on
the existence of an agreement between Blue Cross and Wesley's hospital
competitors, the harm that Wesley sustained, and the causal link between the agreement and the harm. The probative requirements of the
personal harm story can be satisfied without having to answer the "why"
question. Wesley could prove each element of this part of its story
through eyewitness-type evidence and did not have to supply a plausible
rationale for Blue Cross' and competing hospitals' actions. The evidence of an agreement between Blue Cross and Wesley's competitors,
and the evidence of a financial loss sustained by Wesley could stand on
their own and do not require an explanation of how the parties to the
agreement benefitted from it. If the first part of Wesley's story
amounted to a per se antitrust offense and constituted the whole story,
the probative aspect of that story would not be particularly noteworthy.
12.

Id. at 964.

13. Id. at 964 n.18.
14. This is a familiar requirement originating in the common law, a historic source of
modem antitrust statutes. Among the most frequently cited common law antitrust decisions are Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711) and Darcy v. Allein (Case of
Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602). As in the law of torts, defendant's conduct
must be both the direct cause of the alleged antitrust injury, but for which the injury would
not have occurred, and also a proximate cause of such injury, meaning, essentially that
defendant's conduct in a particular situation is inherently prone to result in an antitrust
injury.
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In fact, the trial judge apparently did have a great deal of evidence of the
agreement, the injury, and the link between the two.
The second part of Wesley's story is particularly difficult to convey,
however. On the descriptive side, there were allegations that consumers-Wichita residents who bought medical insurance-had been
harmed by Blue Cross' conduct, because Blue Cross' actions would lead
to higher medical insurance costs to consumers. Blue Cross vigorously
denied that such an outcome was likely. What type of probative evidence should the court have found persuasive?
PROBATIVE EVIDENCE OF HARM TO CONSUMERS

Testimony from a small sample of consumers who expected their
overall medical costs to rise was unlikely to help the court with either
translating such an expectation of a price hike into an actual increase in
prices or with directly linking the perceived increase to Blue Cross' past
conduct. Testimony from officials of Blue Cross, or from the two hospitals with which it entered into an agreement, to show they had never
intended to accomplish the anticompetitive goals ascribed to them
would similarly be insufficiently persuasive. This is not because an antitrust defendant's motives do not matter, but rather because the source
of the evidence concerning the parties' true intentions must be independent and objective.' 5 For obvious reasons, testimony from the
parties to an allegedly illegal agreement does not meet that test, and
other evidence is necessary in order to establish what the parties' reasons really were for entering into the agreement.
Before considering what alternative evidence there might be and
what that evidence should have told the court, the threshold objection
to the actual relevance of Blue Cross' and the hospitals' "true" intentions must be resolved. For antitrust liability to exist, there is no requirement that the defendant has either planned or predicted the
negative external effects of its actions on competition in any particular
market. As a practical matter, sophisticated antitrust defendants, such
as Blue Cross, are unlikely to argue as a bona fide defense that they were
not aware of the effects of their conduct on competition. It is safe to
assume that Blue Cross, as well as Wesley's hospital competitors, all
carefully considered the costs and benefits of terminating Wesley. This
was not a decision made in blind rage by Blue Cross and the two hospitals, without regard for the ultimate costs involved. Rather, it was a
move carefully calculated to reduce their costs and increase revenues,
taking both the short- and long-run consequences into account. The
question of why Blue Cross terminated Wesley and why Wesley's competitors acquiesced to lower rates can be restated as how their agreement would improve their profitability. If the increase in Blue Cross'
net revenue came ultimately at the expense of the consumer, then Blue
15. Just like in the car wreck hypothetical discussed above, why Blue Cross acted the
way it did must be answered from the evidence not subject to manipulation by either party.
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Cross acted unlawfully. Alternatively, if termination of Wesley helps
Blue Cross without hurting consumers, then Blue Cross might not have
16
to compensate Wesley for its losses.
Analogously, Wesley's rivals could have only agreed to lower rates
if that led to greater earnings for them. If lower rates and greater earnings for other hospitals did not ultimately harm consumers, then Wesley
probably did not sustain a remediable antitrust injury.
Wesley alleged that Blue Cross benefitted in two ways from the termination. First, it obtained an agreement from Wesley's competitors to
charge lower rates in return for the promise of additional patients. Second, it sent a message to other hospitals that they too could be terminated if they should become Blue Cross' direct competitors in the health
insurance business.
Why would Wesley's competitors enter into the agreement with
Blue Cross? Increasing marginal costs is a standard assumption of
microeconomic theory. Assuming that Wesley's competitors' marginal
costs rose above the relevant range of hospital services, those competitors would inevitably lose money, at least in the short run, as a result of
the agreement. Not only would their costs per patient increase due to
the influx of patients newly lured away from Wesley, but also their receipts per patient would decrease, pursuant to the agreement with Blue
Cross.
As in any predatory pricing case, one must consider the magnitude
of the short-term losses and the ability of the defendant to recoup such
losses in the long run. A predatory pricing argument focuses on the
ability of the defendant to sustain short-term losses to exclude a compet 7
itor from the market for a long enough period of time to recover those
17
losses and to make a profit.
There is no evidence that Wesley's competitors had the ability to
shut Wesley out completely and then keep it out long enough to allow
them to profit from the scheme. While Wesley's receipts per patient
would decrease by an even greater amount than those of its competitors
(reduced payments from Blue Cross plus the added costs from not being
a preferred provider), Wesley's costs per patient would also fall (assuming increasing marginal costs, fewer patients mean lower costs per pa16. This could be essentially a Kaldor-Hicks superior move. If we were concerned
with welfare effects only on Blue Cross and consumers, the move as a result of which Blue
Cross is better off while consumers are either as well off as or better off than they were
originally is Pareto-efficient. With Wesley in the picture, the consequences are more ambiguous. The total size of welfare improvement to Blue Cross and consumers must exceed
the harm suffered by Wesley in order for Blue Cross' actions to be societally efficient.
Antitrust law generally assumes Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in cases when there is any perceptible benefit to a large group of consumers, since in the aggregate such benefits are always
expected to outweigh the harm to a single competitor.
17. The seminal article on predatory pricing is Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and

Related PracticesUnder Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). It has given
rise to a wave of critical literature on the subject, see, e.g., Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the
Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
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tient), unlike the average costs of its competitors, which would go up.
Thus, it seems likely that if we assume rising marginal costs of providing
hospital services, Wesley's competitors would sustain greater losses than
Wesley itself. Under this assumption, it is unclear how Wesley's competitors could expect to outlast Wesley in the market.
The second objection is more peculiar to the present situation.
Wesley alleged, and the court agreed, that Blue Cross had substantial
market power in Wichita. Assuming the court's finding to be correct, it
is unclear how Wesley's competitors could hope to recoup their losses
even if they did manage to drive Wesley permanently out of the market.
By exercising its monopsonistic market power over hospitals, Blue Cross
would always have the ability to prevent them from charging supra-competitive prices (i.e., prices above marginal cost). Again, assuming rising
marginal costs, despite the short-term losses that Wesley's competitors
would sustain, there is no realistic hope for them to recover their losses
in the future.
Consequently, if there was an agreement of the kind alleged by
Wesley between Blue Cross and Wesley's competitors, the assumption
of increasing marginal costs would be inappropriate. If maximizing
profits were the chief objective of Wesley's competitors,' 8 and if the cost
to them of treating each additional patient was higher than the cost of
treating the preceding patient, then their agreement with Blue Cross
would be completely nonsensical. Why would they want to attract additional patients when the cost of serving them exceeded the additional
revenue they brought in?
Resolution of this paradox is the key to understanding this case.
The agreement can only make sense if the assumption of increasing
marginal costs is abandoned. If the hospitals competing with Wesley for
patients are rational economic actors, then excess capacity and resulting
scale economies are the only logical explanation for their actions. Suppose that a miscalculation many years ago in the extent of demand for
hospital services led to an overbuilding of hospitals. There could have
been many reasons for such a miscalculation, ranging from unpredicted
population shifts, to improvements in outpatient treatment and shortening of required lengths of hospital stays, to effectiveness of preventive
medicine. Most significantly, improvements in medical technology may
now lead to speedier recovery, again resulting in overcapacity.
Under these circumstances, hospitals would be expected to react to
decreasing marginal costs by reducing their prices and expanding output. The complicating factor here, however, is that Blue Cross acts as a
monopsonistic and- monopolistic intermediary between hospitals and
I
18. Some of Wesley's competitors may be non-profit organizations. That, however,
does not affect this analysis: while a not-for-profit hospital may have goals other than
profit maximization, reduction of costs and increase of revenues is always an essential concern. A non-profit hospital may be willing to treat certain indigent patients at below marginal cost, foregoing some revenue in pursuit of its non-profit imperatives. Such a hospital
is unlikely, however, to posit sheer bigness as an imperative and to be willing to lose
money simply in order to exclude a competitor.
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their ultimate consumers-patients. If any one hospital unilaterally lowered the rates it charged Blue Cross, additional patients would not necessarily flock to that hospital. A hospital cannot compete with other
hospitals based on price, and thus cannot attract additional patients by
lowering its prices.
Let us now consider the dynamics of the process by which Wichita
hospitals can actually adjust to the emergence of excess capacity and
bring their prices and output into equilibrium. Suppose a hospital had
lowered its Blue Cross rates. Since patients pay a fixed amount to Blue
Cross, they would not shift their consumption to the lower priced facility
without some type of prodding from Blue Cross. As a result, the hospital that lowered its rates would merely lose revenue, with no compensatory savings from additional patients or a decrease in per-patient costs.
Blue Cross might lower the rates it charged its current subscribers
and try luring new subscribers from other medical insurers in the area.
This reshuffling of insureds to Blue Cross from other insurance companies, however, would be of little consequence to the actual providers of
medical services-the hospitals. Even after Blue Cross obtains additional subscribers, the one hospital that had lowered its rates might
never see a sufficient increase in the number of patients that it treats.
More fundamentally, Wichita may already have more hospital beds
than its residents could use at any price that is at or over the cost of
providing them.' 9 Even if all Wichita hospitals lowered the rates they
charged all their patients and insurers, none of the hospitals would necessarily enjoy a sufficient output increase to offset the lower rates. In an
unconcentrated market saddled with overcapacity, such as the Wichita
hospital market, a supplier could not lower its prices without an assurance that elimination of some of its extra capacity would accompany this
price reduction and allow it to expand output.
Blue Cross attempted to provide precisely the mechanism that
Wichita consumers needed. By imposing new costs on Wesley, causing
a reduction in Wesley's market share, Blue Cross tried to guarantee
Wesley's competitors at least some new patients. Patients would have
had the incentive to leave Wesley for one of its preferred-provider competitors, which, in turn, would have either reduced or eliminated these
competitors' extra capacity. By reducing the number of hospital options
for its insureds, Blue Cross decreased the cost of treatment at remaining
hospitals. Some of the reduction in cost would have been passed to the
consumers in the form of lower health insurance premiums, possibly
strengthening Blue Cross' market power in the health financing market.
Since a decrease in the number of hospitals an insurer has to deal with
lowers the insurer's costs, some increase in concentration in both the
financing and hospital markets would have been the longer term
prospect.
19. In addition to hospital expenses, a patient incurs other costs by being hospitalized. Even if hospitals treated patients for free, patients would limit their consumption of
hospital services because of the value of time they would have to spend in treatment.
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Greater market concentration, however, was unlikely to cause either
an actual monopolization of both markets or a significant increase in
consumer prices, as alleged by Wesley. Once unneeded hospital beds
were permanently eliminated, remaining hospitals would function at
more efficient levels, presumably nearer to capacity. Competition in the
health financing market could then pick up, since hospitals would no
longer have to fear Blue Cross' retaliation for doing business with its
competitors. Blue Cross found a way to reduce its costs by bringing the
number of hospital beds down to an efficient level. Although in the
short run, Blue Cross' conduct might chill competition in the insurance
market, in the long run, assuming no other inordinate entry barriers,
competition would regain its vigor, and consumers would enjoy lower
insurance premiums.
THE MORAL OF THE STORY

Wesley told the court a convincing story about the harm Blue Cross
had inflicted upon it. The trial court ordered Blue Cross to pay Wesley's damages and the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed. Whether "fairness"
and "justice" have been served by the outcome of this case is not this
Article's concern, for this all depends on one's understanding of those
exalted concepts. Have the courts applied the antitrust laws correctly in
order to justify their decision? Can Blue Cross' liability be legitimately
predicated on the Sherman Act?
To answer this question properly, in this case and in most other
antitrust cases, courts must recognize the special requirements of proof
that antitrust claimants must meet. Whenever the law requires proof of
injury to consumer welfare, courts should seek the most rational explanation for the conduct of all market participants. Angry testimony from
injured representatives of the "consuming public" cannot be sufficient;
someone should have to explain why the defendant acted in a certain
way and why the defendant's ultimate objectives were incompatible with
maximizing consumer welfare.
In Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the probative evidence needed
to support the allegation of consumer harm actually points the other
way. 20 The objective served by the alleged agreement between Blue
Cross and the hospitals was not incompatible with the consumers' interest in lower hospital prices and lower health insurance premiums.

20. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 960-66.

